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THE VALUE OF LIFE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
CITIZENS' USE OF DEADLY FORCE
F. Patrick Hubbard
INTRODUCTION
The shooting of Treyvon Martin by George Zimmerman has focused
attention on governmental authorizations of citizens' use of deadly force.'
This attention is long overdue because many "lawful" killings by citizens
occur in situations where the victim posed no threat to the shooter or other
persons.2 For example, Gregory Duncan "lawfully" shot Christopher Spicer
on Duncan's porch largely because Spicer was rude and unmannerly.' In
another case, Thomas Cooney and James Hall, two white men, staked out a
wooded area where some copper tubing stolen from their business had been
hidden.' When Carlton Williams, an African American, arrived and went
straight to the copper, they arrested him at gunpoint. When Williams ran
away, Cooney "lawfully" shot and killed Williams with a pistol loaded with
hollow-point bullets.'
This Article addresses the constitutionality of private citizens' "law-
ful" uses of such deadly violence in terms of three situations: (1) imple-
menting a citizen's arrest and preventing crime; (2) protecting intrusions
into one's metaphorical "castle"; and (3) preventing crime and "standing
one's ground" in a confrontation with an attacker. Underlying all three situ-
ations is the issue of whether a particular use of deadly force (i.e., force
sufficient to kill or seriously injure a person) is "legitimate." Because a
* Motley Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. The
Author appreciates the helpful comments of Derek W. Black, Josie F. Brown, Robert L. Felix, Stuart
Green, and Colin Miller on a draft of this Article. He also appreciates the assistance of David 1. Bruck,
Merl Code, Donald Songer, and Candle Wester in researching details concerning State v. Cooney, 463
S.E.2d 597 (S.C. 1995).
1 See, e.g., John Cloud, The Law Heard Round the World, TIME, Apr. 9, 2012, at 36. For further
discussion of this shooting, see infra notes 189-196 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Jack Healy, Unarmed and Gunned Down by Homeowner in His "Castle," N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/us/castle-law-at-issue-after-fatal-montana-shoot
ing.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
3 See infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
4 Cooney, 463 S.E.2d at 598.
5 Id. Cooney and Hall testified that they left after the shooting because they thought Williams had
not been shot. However, Cooney returned the next morning, found Williams's dead body, and subse-
quently informed the police. Id. For further discussion of Cooney, see infra notes 81-90 and accompa-
nying text.
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state has a "monopoly of the legitimate use" of deadly force,' the use of
such force is only legitimate if the state has authorized that use. In the
American constitutional system of legitimacy, there are limits on the state's
power to authorize the use of deadly force. Because the use of such force
can deny a victim's fundamental constitutional right to life, these limits
require that authorizations of deadly force be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.
As a result, a state is prohibited from overbroad authorizations of the
use of deadly force by governmental officials like police. However, some
courts have ruled that these limits do not apply to authorizations of private
citizens' use of deadly force.' This Article argues that, because of the
unique nature of the state's monopoly on deadly force, these cases are
wrong. This Article also argues that most states have adopted similar un-
constitutionally overbroad authorizations of citizens' use of deadly force.
Part I of this Article develops the point that life is especially valuable
in terms of: (1) the state's monopoly on deadly force, (2) the two categories
of deadly force-prohibited and authorized-and (3) the constitutional con-
cern for the fundamental right to life. Part II addresses the constitutionality
of state authorizations of citizens' use of deadly force to prevent crime and
to arrest a fleeing felon. Part III addresses the constitutionality of recent
statutory expansions of authorizations of the use of deadly force to protect a
citizen's "castle." Part IV addresses the right to "stand your ground," rather
than retreat when it is safe to do so, in the face of a deadly threat. Part V
considers issues concerning the application of the constitutional limits on
the authorization of deadly force. Part VI contains a short concluding sum-
mary.
I. THE VALUE OF LIFE
A. The State's Monopoly on Deadly Force
Because life is "the necessary condition for the enjoyment of all other
goods[,]. . . every person by and large tends to value his life preeminently,
and any society must place a high value on preserving it."' Given this im-
portance and human vulnerability to bodily attack, the most important legal
prohibitions "are those that restrict the use of violence in killing or inflict-
ing bodily harm."' Without such restrictions, "what point could there
6 MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (H.
H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) (emphasis omitted).
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 871, 871 (1976).
9 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 194 (2d ed. 1994).
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be ... in having rules of any other kind?"'o An analysis of these legal pro-
hibitions, as well as the corresponding legal authorizations of deadly vio-
lence, involves two dimensions: factual and normative.
From a factual perspective, "a [nation] state is a human community
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory."" Because the government is "the one entity
that retains a monopoly over legitimate violence," 2 "the right to use physi-
cal force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent
to which the state permits it . .. [and] [t]he state is considered the sole
source of the 'right' to use violence."" Thus, "[o]ne of the most common
[attributes of a failing state] is the loss of physical control of its territory or
monopoly on the legitimate use of force." 4 On the other hand, in a success-
ful state, the state certifies all deaths and investigates all homicides. In addi-
tion, the monopoly is so total that you cannot lawfully consent to your own
killing" or, in a few states, commit suicide."
The normative dimension involves the legitimacy of the state's author-
ization of physical coercion." Legitimacy "is particularly powerful where,
10 Id. (emphasis omitted).
11 WEBER, supra note 6, at 78. Weber's characterization of the state in terms of its "monopoly of
the legitimate use" of physical-and, by extension, deadly-force is widely used today. See, e.g.,
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 23 (1974) ("A state claims a monopoly on deciding
who may use force when; it says that only it may decide who may use force and under what conditions;
it reserves to itself the sole right to pass on the legitimacy and permissibility of any use of force within
its boundaries; furthermore it claims the right to punish all those who violate its claimed monopoly.");
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 136 (1993) ("[P]olitical power is always coercive power backed
by the government's use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding
its laws."). From an anthropological perspective:
The concentration of all physical force in the hands of the central authority is the primary
function of the state and is its decisive characteristic. In order to make this clear, consider
what may not be done under the state form of rule: no one in the society governed by the
state may take another's life, do him physical harm, touch his property, or damage his reputa-
tion, save by permission of the state. The offices of the state have powers to take life, inflict
corporal punishment, seize property as fine or by expropriation, and affect the standing and
reputation of a member of the society.
LAWRENCE KRADER, FORMATION OF THE STATE 21 (Marshall D. Sahlins ed., 1968).
12 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-2, at 1306 (2d ed. 1988).
13 WEBER, supra note 6, at 78. This same point is also developed below at note 30 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the lack of a category of deadly force that is neither permitted nor prohibited).
14 Blake Hounshell, 2009 Failed States Index - FAQ & Methodology, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 22,
2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failedstates index faq methodology.
15 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that there is no funda-
mental right to assisted suicide and that a state's ban on assisted suicides was rationally related to legit-
imate state interests); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.8, at 700 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that one
who kills a person at that person's request is guilty of murder).
16 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 7.8, at 699 (noting that attempted suicide is a crime in some
states).
17 MAX WEBER, Political Communities, in MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 338,
341 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954) [hereinafter WEBER, Political Communities]; WEBER, supra note 6, at
78-79.
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and in so far as, communal action comprises physical coercion, including
the power to dispose over life and death.""
The belief in the specific legitimacy of political action can, and under modem conditions ac-
tually does, increase to a point where only certain political communities, viz., the "states,"
are considered to be capable of "legitimizing," by virtue of mandate or permission, the exer-
cise of physical coercion by any other community. For the purpose of threatening and exer-
cising such coercion, the fully matured political community has developed a system of casu-
istic rules to which that particular "legitimacy" is imputed. This system of rules constitutes
the "legal order," and the political community is regarded as its sole normal creator, since
that community has, in modem times, normally usurped the monopoly of the power to com-
pel by physical coercion respect for those rules.' 9
In American culture, legitimacy is often viewed in terms of "social
contract" analysis. For example, Hobbes argued that accepting a social con-
tract that grants the sovereign the monopoly on deadly violence is rational
because the state provides the best means to protect that which is "dearest"
to a person: "his own life, & limbs."2" Moreover, argued Hobbes, in order to
be effective in protecting "life and limbs," this delegation of power must be
total because "when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted
away his Right [to freedom]; then is he said to be Obliged, or Bound, not to
hinder those, to whom such Right is granted."2 1 Such an absolute delegation
may be a rational choice in comparison to living in the Hobbesian state of
nature, which he characterized as a state "where every man is Enemy to
every man," and where there is "continuall feare, and danger of violent
death," and where "the life of man . . . [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish,
and short."22
However, from a more optimistic Lockean view of the state of nature,
a limited state may be a more rational approach to protecting life.23 Locke
argued that even though the state of nature has some degree of order the
enjoyment of freedom in that state "is very uncertain ... [and] full of fears
18 WEBER, Political Communities, supra note 17, at 341.
19 Id
20 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 383 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651).
21 Id. at 191.
22 Id at 186.
23 John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in
THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 424, 424-25 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., Random House
1994). The essay is often referred to as a treatise and is the second of Locke's two treatises of govern-
ment published in 1690. Id. at 424 n. 1. Locke characterizes the state of nature as follows:
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state
have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty
to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use
than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govem it,
which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but
consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions.
Id. at 426.
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and continual dangers."24 Consequently, it is rational "to join in society with
others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general
name, property." 25 Implicit in the argument that it is rational to join in such
a Lockean agreement is the view that government could not "possibly be
absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people." 26 Though
Locke may be overly optimistic about the possibility of absolutism, he
clearly recognizes that, without limits on the state, there is a risk that deadly
force is "legitimate" only in the ipse dixit sense that the violence is proper
simply because the state authorities have said so.
Locke had an enormous impact on colonial culture in the United
States. 27 For example, the Declaration of Colonial Rights, adopted in 1774
by the First Continental Congress, claims that persons have a natural right
to "life, liberty, & property."28 Similarly, the Declaration of Independence
declares the "self-evident" truth "that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." 29 This rights-oriented
view also underlies the Bill of Rights-for example, the Fifth Amend-
ment's prohibition of any denial of "life, liberty, or property" without due
process of law.
B. Categories of Deadly Force
Given the successful modem state's monopoly on deadly force, there
are only two categories of deadly force: (1) permitted, or legitimate, and
thus excused or justified; and (2) prohibited, and thus either a criminal
homicide or assault and also, perhaps, a tort. There is no third category of
24 Id. at 476.
25 id.
26 Id. at 480.
27 See, e.g., CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 26-29 (1922) (discussing the influence of natural rights philosophy on American
colonies); Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARv. L. REV. 365, 383 (1929) (same).
28 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 67 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 1904). This right rests on "the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution,
and the several charters or compacts." Id.
29 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Similar language is found in the
Virginia Bill of Rights, adopted on June 12, 1776, VA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, and in the Massachusetts Bill
of Rights, adopted in 1780, MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1. The Virginia Bill of Rights, which was drafted by
George Mason, provides:
[A]Il men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of
which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
VA. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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"private" deadly violence that the legal system has not determined to be
permitted or prohibited or, alternatively, has no concern for addressing.
Such a third category would violate the "social contract" to grant the state a
monopoly on deadly force based on our desire to protect ourselves from
non-legitimate "private" deadly force.
This denial of the existence of a third category does not necessarily in-
volve a claim of an enforceable, positive right concerning the details of
otherwise constitutional prohibitions or authorizations of the use of deadly
force. Within broad constitutional limits, states may categorize violent ac-
tions differently.30 Nor does it involve an assertion of a judicially enforcea-
ble positive right to a particular level of preventive or deterrent measures to
enforce a prohibition. Instead, the following two claims are made: First, no
successful modern state can simultaneously claim a monopoly on all deadly
violence while also saying it neither prohibits nor allows a particular use of
deadly force. Second, this lack of a third category substantially affects con-
stitutional analysis of authorizations of deadly force.
C. Constitutional Limitations: The Fundamental Right to Life
The Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, is a central part of the
American approach to implementing a Lockean "contract" with meaningful
limits on the legitimate use of the government's monopoly on deadly force.
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to estab-
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and prop-
erty, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.3'
In a sense, the right to life is the most fundamental constitutional right of
all. When one is dead, liberty, property, and First Amendment rights are
meaningless.
In terms of the constitutional scheme of protecting our lives by explicit
limits on the government's authorization or prohibition of deadly force,
cases involving the application of several constitutional provisions or rights
are especially important. Those rights and provisions are (1) the Second
Amendment right of citizens to bear arms for self-defense; (2) the Fourth
Amendment's prohibitions of "unreasonable . . . seizures;" (3) the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of due process; (4) the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the
context of capital punishment; and (5) the constitutional right of privacy's
30 See infra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
31 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (emphasis added).
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limitations on state prohibitions of abortions. Though varying in important
details,32 cases in all five areas indicate that life is a fundamental right and
that therefore citizens' use of deadly force must be limited to narrowly
drawn authorizations where a compelling state interest outweighs the fun-
damental right to life.33
1. Second Amendment
The Second Amendment "right of the people to keep and bear Arms"34
protects "the inherent right of self-defense."" District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler" held that a District of Columbia ordinance, which totally banned hand-
guns in the home and required lawful guns to be bound by a trigger lock or
be disassembled at all times, was an unconstitutional denial of this inherent
right because the ordinance made it "impossible for citizens to use [fire-
arms] for the core lawful purpose of self defense."" McDonald v. City of
Chicago" held that the Second Amendment right to self-defense applied to
the states as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the handgun
bans at issue were unconstitutional." McDonald summarized Heller as fol-
lows: "Explaining that 'the need for defense of self, family, and property is
most acute' in the home, we found that this right applies to handguns be-
cause they are 'the most preferred firearm in the nation to "keep" and use
for protection of one's home and family."' 4 0
Heller and McDonald do not develop the details concerning self-
defense, but McDonald notes that "[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recog-
nized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day."4'
Though the basic right to use deadly force to defend one's self or other per-
sons has deep historical roots, the details of the defense have varied. Gener-
ally, the traditional requirements in the United States can be summarized in
terms of three elements: First, the defendant was without fault in bringing
32 For example, there are differences among these areas because the second, third, and fourth
categories limit the state's substantive power to use or authorize deadly force while the first category
and, to some extent, the fifth category place limits on the state's right to prohibit the use of deadly force
by citizens.
3 See infra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
35 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008); see McDonald v. City of Chicago,
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) ("Self-defense is a basic right...."). For a discussion of this inherent
right in social contract terms, see Kadish, supra note 8, at 884-85.
36 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
37 Id. at 630.
38 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
39 Id. at 3050.
40 Id at 3036 (citations omitted) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29).
41 Id
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on the difficulty.4 2 Second, the defendant must have both an actual and
reasonable belief that the use of that deadly force is necessary to prevent an
imminent threat of serious harm (i.e., a threat of death, serious bodily harm,
kidnapping, or serious sexual assault).43 Third, the amount of force used
must be proportional to the threat involved; a person is only authorized to
use deadly force to respond to threats of serious harm."
The states have often disagreed over the details. For example, despite
agreement that the threat must be imminent, the states disagree about the
imminence requirement's application in "battered spouse" situations.45 Con-
siderable disagreement also exists over the necessity requirement. Where a
person can, without threat to himself, avoid the use of deadly force, some
states view the use of such force as not necessary and require that he retreat
from the situation, unless he is in his home (or, in some jurisdictions, at an
equivalent of "home," such as his place of work).46 Other states do not re-
quire retreat.47
Finally, there is disagreement about several specific details concerning
the defense of others. First, some jurisdictions require a specific type of
relationship between the defender and the person being defended.48 Second,
where a defender makes a reasonable mistake about whether the person
being threatened would have a right to self-defense, jurisdictions disagree
about whether the defender's use of deadly force is justified.49 Third, there
may be difficulty in jurisdictions requiring retreat for self-defense because
of the need to determine whether and how the rule applies to the defender
and to the person defended."o
Regardless of the details of self-defense, Heller and McDonald affirm
both the unique value of life and the Lockean natural right of each individ-
ual to protect one's self and family from the threat of death or serious harm
by wrongdoers, particularly within the home. The affirmation of the funda-
mental value of life for both the defender and the attacker is echoed in the
traditional common law requirements of imminence, necessity, and propor-
tionality.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); LAFAVE, supra note 15,
§ 5.7, at 497.
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b); LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 5.7(b), at 492-93.
44 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b); LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 5.7(b), at 492-93.
45 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 5.7(d), at 496-97.
46 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1); LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 5.7(0, at 497-99.
47 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 5.7(), at 498-99.
48 Id. § 5.8(a), at 501.
49 Id. § 5.8(b), at 502-03.
50 Id. § 5.8(c), at 503.
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2. Fourth Amendment
Tennessee v. Garner" involved the shooting of an unarmed suspect
fleeing from a burglary of an unoccupied house.5 2 The Court held that im-
plementing an arrest by the use of deadly force is a "seizure" subject to the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement." The Court noted that
there are
many cases in which this Court, by balancing the extent of the intrusion against the need for
it, has examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is conducted.
To determine the constitutionality of a seizure "[w]e must balance the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."54
In terms of this balancing test, the Court noted:
The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched. The suspect 'sfunda-
mental interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force also frus-
trates the interest of the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of guilt and pun-
ishment. Against these interests are ranged governmental interests in effective law enforce-
ment....
Without in any way disparaging the importance of these [law enforcement] goals, we
are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a sufficiently productive means of accom-
plishing them to justify the killing of nonviolent suspects.ss
Given this balancing, the Court held that deadly force may not be used
"[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat
to others."" Because of the wide range of felonies in contemporary criminal
law and because not all felonies are now punishable by death, the fact that a
suspect is a fleeing felon does not by itself satisfy this standard of threat of
harm." The Court also noted that burglary is not a crime that by itself indi-
cates a threat of serious harm." Consequently, the Tennessee statute author-
izing deadly force to arrest a fleeing felon was unconstitutional except
where "the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others."59
51 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
52 Id. at 3-4.
53 Id. at 7.
54 Id. at 7-8 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
55 Id at 9-10 (emphasis added).
56 Id at I1.
57 Garner,471 U.S. at I1.
58 Id. at 21-22.
59 Id. at I1.
631
632 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 21:3
3. Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth
Amendment
The Fifth Amendment explicitly provides: "No person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... "o The Fourteenth Amendment has a similar guarantee. Johnson v.
Zerbst6' noted that the right to "the Assistance of Counsel"
is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental
human rights of hfe and liberty.... [P]rovisions of this and other Amendments were submit-
ted by the first Congress convened under that Constitution as essential barriers against arbi-
trary or unjust deprivation of human rights. 62
4. Eighth Amendment
A clear recognition of the fundamental value of life underlies the Su-
preme Court's approach to capital punishment. Beginning with Furman v.
Georgia' and Gregg v. Georgia,' the Court has required that states provide
sufficient procedural safeguards to provide a meaningful basis for identify-
ing persons to be executed.65 In addition, because of the impact of the death
penalty on the "fundamental right to life," 66 the Court has imposed a num-
ber of substantive limits. For example, the death penalty can only be im-
posed for egregious murders where "aggravating circumstances," like tor-
ture, exist.67 Given this limit, it cannot be imposed for rape.6 1 In addition,
the death penalty cannot be imposed on persons who are insane69 or on per-
sons who were under the age of eighteen" or mentally retarded" when they
committed the murders.
60 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
62 Id. at 462 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
63 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (striking down a scheme lacking sufficient procedur-
al safeguards).
6 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding scheme with sufficient procedural
safeguards).
65 See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, "Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Pat-
terns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1114-21 (1985).
66 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986).
67 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 (plurality opinion) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion).
69 See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410-11 (plurality opinion) (requiring full and fair hearing on issue of
insanity); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934-35 (2007) (applying Ford).
70 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56 (2005).
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5. Right of Privacy/Abortions
In addressing the limits on the state's right to prohibit abortions result-
ing from the constitutional right of privacy, Roe v. Wade72 held that, even
though a fetus is not a person, the state has a "compelling" interest "in pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life" after the first trimester." Roe also
held that, after the third trimester, the state "may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary .. . for the preserva-
tion of the life or health of the mother." 74
Thus, Roe establishes two points for the period after the first trimester.
First, both the interest in the potential life of the fetus and the interest of the
life of the mother are compelling." Second, where these interests conflict,
the fundamental value of an existing life outweighs the compelling interest
in a potential life.76
II. CITIZEN'S ARREST AND CRIME PREVENTION
A. Current Law
As indicated above,n Tennessee v. Garner held that an arrest by the
use of deadly force was a "seizure" and that deadly force could only be
used where the suspect poses a threat of harm to the arresting officer or to
others.7 ' Though one state appellate court has held that Garner applies to
citizens,"7 two state supreme courts have held that Garner does not apply to
lawful arrests by citizens and that, therefore, a state may authorize the use
of deadly force by a citizen in a situation where an officer could not use
such force."
71 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002).
72 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73 Id. at 162-63.
74 Id. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
75 Id. at 162-63.
76 Id.
7 See supra Part 1.C.2.
78 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
7 State v. Pecora, 622 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
80 People v. Couch, 461 N.w.2d 683, 684 (Mich. 1990); State v. Cooney, 463 S.E.2d 597, 599
(S.C. 1995); see, e.g., State v. Clothier, 753 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Kan. 1988) (holding that Garner did not
apply in a criminal case to the use of deadly force to protect property or a dwelling and that citizens
could use deadly force to protect either even if there was no personal threat to the citizen using the
deadly force); State v. Johnson, 954 P.2d 79, 86 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (agreeing with Cooney but fol-
lowing the Garner approach in interpreting a state statute on the basis of "the public policy informing
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Garner"); LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 3.9(b), at 505-06; see gen-
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In State v. Cooney,"' the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
Cooney's murder conviction for fatally shooting Carlton Williams, who had
fled from Cooney's citizen's arrest for allegedly stealing some copper tub-
ing.8 2 Cooney admitted shooting at the decedent with a pistol loaded with
hollow-point bullets but "claimed to have been shooting at the ground and
not aiming to kill him."83 On appeal, Cooney argued that the trial court
erred in refusing to charge the jury that, under the common law, a citizen
like Cooney could use "reasonable means to effect" a lawful arrest.84
The trial judge had denied the charge on the grounds that Garner ap-
plied and thus barred the use of deadly force on these facts." The judge also
held that shooting under the circumstances was per se unreasonable." The
South Carolina Supreme Court held that Garner did not apply and that there
was a jury issue as to "reasonableness" under the South Carolina rule au-
thorizing citizens to use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon." The
conviction, therefore, was reversed," and the state chose not to pursue fur-
ther prosecution of Cooney.89
The result of this reversal is that, in a future case, a jury could find the
force used to apprehend a fleeing felon by a person in Cooney's situation to
be "reasonable," and thus legitimate, regardless of whether it believed the
shooter was aiming to kill or was shooting with a reckless disregard of hu-
man life and safety. (It is hard to believe that intentionally shooting in the
direction of a person is not at least reckless.) But for the authorization of
force in the context of a common law citizen's arrest, either shooting to kill
or shooting recklessly would be criminal homicide."o
erally Thomas J. Griffin, Annotation, Private Person's Authority, in Making Arrest for Felony, to Shoot
or Kill Alleged Felon, 32 A.L.R. 3d 1078 (1970).
81 463 S.E.2d 597 (S.C. 1995). For additional facts in Cooney, see supra notes 4-5 and accompa-
nying text.
82 Id. at 598.
83 Id
84 Id at 598-99.
85 Id. at 598.
86 d
87 Cooney, 463 S.E.2d at 599.
88 Id. at 600.
89 E-mail from David I. Bruck, Clinical Professor of Law, Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law,
to Author (Feb. 19, 2013, 1:07 PM) (on file with author) (e-mail from Cooney's attomey on appeal
noting that the case "was not reprosecuted after the convictions were reversed" and that the defendant
"served a few months in the [South Carolina Department of Corrections] before being released on ap-
peal bond"). Cooney spent about half a year in prison between his conviction and release on bond during
appeal. E-mail from Jannita Gaston, Div. Dir., S.C. Dep't of Corr., to Candle M. Wester, Assistant Dir.
for Faculty Servs., Univ. of S.C. Sch. of Law (Feb. 26, 2013, 11:34 AM) (on file with author).
90 Under South Carolina law, if Cooney had been aiming to kill he would be guilty of murder if
the common law of citizen's arrest did not apply. See WILLIAM SHEPARD MCANINCH ET AL., THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 93-94, 97-103 (5th ed. 2007). If Cooney had been extremely
reckless in shooting at the ground in the direction of the victim, he would have been guilty of murder.
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The defendant in People v. Couch," a Michigan Supreme Court citi-
zen's arrest case, heard the sound of his car alarm and went to investigate.9 2
A man near the parking lot driveway yelled something and then ran away.93
When Couch reached his car, he observed Alphonso Tucker bending for-
ward on the front seat of the car.94 It appeared that the car stereo had been
dismantled. Couch drew his revolver and demanded that Tucker exit the car
so that the police could be called." When Tucker exited, Couch said, "Get
out of the car and go with me so I can call the police."" Tucker then lunged
at Couch and proceeded to run away. When Tucker was about twenty to
thirty feet away, Couch fatally shot him."
Couch held that Garner did not apply to deadly force used in a citi-
zen's arrest. The court also held that it would not use its common law pow-
er to change the current common law citizen's arrest rule, which permitted
the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon.98 Given the facts of the
case, it appears that Couch, like Cooney, would not be punished for the
intentional shooting of a non-dangerous fleeing thief.
B. Constitutionality
The courts gave two grounds for the holdings in Cooney and Couch.
First, the decisions took the position that a private use of deadly force is
like a private search, which is not subject to the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule and, therefore, there is no state action or involvement in the
context of citizen's arrests to trigger the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Second, the decisions noted that Garner was a Section 1983 civil
suit and took the view that Garner did not, and could not, hold that a state
must criminalize a particular use of deadly force.'" These grounds do not
support the constitutionality of the killings involved for three reasons.
First, the grant of power to a citizen to arrest necessarily involves the
state in that arrest. The point of any arrest (and of the use of force to effect
the arrest) is to seize the suspect and take him to governmental authorities.
A citizen acting pursuant to this authority is acting as an agent of the state
Id. at 94-95. If he had been merely reckless, he would have been guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Id.
at 195-201.
91 461 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 1990).




96 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 Couch, 461 N.W.2d at 689 (Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98 Id. at 684-86 (majority opinion).
99 See id. at 684; State v. Cooney, 463 S.E.2d 597, 599 (S.C. 1995).
100 See Couch, 461 N.W.2d at 684; Cooney, 463 S.E.2d at 599 n.2.
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because: (1) having authorized the arrest and use of force, the state clearly
knows of and acquiesces in the arrest and use of force; and (2) the person
making the arrest intends to act as an agent of the state in seizing the sus-
pect and delivering the suspect to authorities. Where searches are involved,
these two factors would show that the citizen was acting as an agent of the
government.'o' Thus, the citizen making the arrest is also acting as an agent
of the state. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment governs the arrest, and Gar-
ner applies to the use of deadly force to implement the arrest.
Second, the courts' reasoning ignores the state's monopoly on deadly
force. Because of this monopoly, where the state does not prohibit use of
deadly force, it has necessarily authorized such use.10 2 The Supreme Court
clearly has authority to prohibit state authorizations of the use of deadly
force which are unconstitutional. For example, even in the context of ex-
tremely lengthy and careful due process, states cannot authorize the use of
capital punishment to punish a rape or to punish a juvenile or a mentally
retarded person for murder.'03 Consequently, the Supreme Court clearly has
the power to declare that the authorization to shoot a non-dangerous felon is
unconstitutional.
Third, because of this power, even if the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to a citizen's arrest, the citizen's use of deadly force is subject to the
requirements of equal protection and due process. The right to equal protec-
tion is relevant because the authorization of the use of deadly force results
in two classes of non-dangerous suspects: (1) those arrested by police, who,
as a result of Garner, cannot be authorized to use deadly force; and (2)
those arrested by citizens, who are authorized to use deadly force. Where a
fundamental right like the right to life is involved, the right to substantive
due process is also involved.
The analysis of this differential treatment of a fundamental right under
equal protection and substantive due process is basically the same: in-
fringements by the government are subject to strict scrutiny.'" Under this
approach, the government must show: (1) the right is justified by a compel-
ling state interest, and (2) the law at issue has been narrowly drawn to pro-
tect that interest.'05
101 See, e.g., United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 418 (6th Cir. 2008) (using a two-factor test for
determining whether a private citizen was acting as an agent of the state in conducting a search: (1) the
government's knowledge or acquiescence in the search; and (2) the intent of the private person conduct-
ing the search).
102 See supra Part L A.
103 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
104 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554 (4th ed. 2011).
105 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at 554.
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An authorization of the use of deadly force to implement an arrest is
overbroad, and thus not narrowly tailored, if it includes the use of deadly
force to seize suspects who pose no threat to the person making the arrest or
to others. Garner determined that the "governmental interest in effective
law enforcement" did not justify authorizing police to shoot non-dangerous
suspects.o 6 Though Garner applied the Fourth Amendment's reasonable-
ness standard, the balancing test used in Garner is basically the same as the
strict balancing test applicable to a fundamental right under equal protection
and due process. Thus, the result of the balancing test should be the same
where citizens use deadly force. If anything, trained professional police
should have more, not less, authority to shoot fleeing suspects."'
Preventing crime is also an important governmental interest, and many
states authorize citizens to use force-including, in some states, deadly
force-to prevent crime.'o There is no reason the approach in Garner
should not apply to authorizations of deadly force to prevent crime, includ-
ing the prevention of felonies and burglaries. Garner held that, because the
terms felony and burglary include so many types of unlawful conduct,
committing a felony or a burglary did not, by itself, justify using deadly
force to apprehend a felon or a burglar.' Given this holding, prevention of
such broad criminal categories should not by itself provide a compelling
state interest sufficient to justify using deadly force.
106 See supra Part I.C.2.
107 See, e.g., State v. Weddell, 43 P.3d 987, 988 (Nev. 2002) (en banc) (finding that post-Garner
state legislation repealing the fleeing-felon rule and limiting the use of deadly force by police officers
indicated legislative intent to abrogate the common-law fleeing-felon rule in the context of citizen
arrests); State v. Pecora, 622 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (applying Garner to a citizen's
arrest).
108 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) ("burglary in any degree");
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 776.012(1), 776.013(3), 776.08 (West 2010) (authorizing the use of deadly force in
limited circumstances and defining "forcible felony"); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (West, Westlaw
through 2013) ("forcible felony"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (LexisNexis 2008) ("felony involv-
ing the use of force"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (2013) (forcible felony); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 627:4.11(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (deadly force permitted against a person using "any unlawful force
against a person present while committing or attempting to commit a burglary"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
2-7.A (West 2003) ("Homicide is justifiable.. . when committed ... in necessarily defending against
any unlawful action directed against himself ... or family."); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 35.15(2)(c), 140.20
(McKinney 2009) (permitting the use of deadly force when a person "reasonably believes that such
other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary," and defining "burglary in the third
degree"). For a discussion of crime prevention in the context of defense of one's "castle," see infra notes
113-114 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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III. DEFENSE OF HOME, "SANCTUARY," OR "CASTLE"
Because a home provides a "sanctuary" or "castle" where one is free
from both governmental and private intrusions, "our law has long recog-
nized that the home provides a kind of special sanctuary in modern life.""o
As a result, the legal system has traditionally granted people a greater right
to use deadly force where unlawful home intrusions are involved. For ex-
ample, jurisdictions requiring that a person retreat, rather than use deadly
force, in the case of a deadly attack where retreat is a safe option generally
do not require a retreat from one's home."' Many states go beyond this
narrow expansion of the right to use deadly force to respond to a deadly
threat without retreating. In addition, these states authorize the use of dead-
ly force to prevent a felony or burglary, to protect property, or to implement
a person's right to exclude people from a dwelling or vehicle." 2
State schemes authorizing a citizen's use of deadly force in protecting
home and property must comply with the constitutional rights to equal pro-
tection and due process. Because the fundamental right to life is involved,
strict scrutiny is appropriate for the consideration of the interests to be pro-
tected by the authorization of the use of deadly force. However, the extreme
diversity among the states concerning situations where deadly force is au-
thorized complicates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Given this
diversity, the weight of the interest protected by the authorization of the use
of deadly force varies enormously.
Consequently, this Article does not analyze all the schemes that states
use. Instead, the Article focuses on recent statutory schemes that expand the
defense by broadening the concept of castle and of threats justifying the use
of deadly force. Section A discusses these statutes; Section B provides a
constitutional analysis of these statutes; and Section C comments on similar
approaches used by other states.
A. Recent Statutory Expansions of Defense
Recently, a number of states have adopted statutes designed to provide
both greater legal certainty and greater protection for a citizen's "castle" by
granting: (1) a presumption that the use of deadly force to resist "forcible"
intrusions to a person's "castle" is reasonable and, therefore, lawful; and (2)
110 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3105 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
112 LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 5.9(b), at 505-06; see, e.g., State v. Clothier, 753 P.2d 1267, 1270
(Kan. 1988) (holding that Garner did not apply to the use of deadly force to protect property or a dwell-
ing and that a citizen could use deadly force to protect either even if there was no personal threat to the
citizen using the deadly force); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text; infra notes 166-168 and
accompanying text.
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an immunity from both criminal and civil prosecution."' For example, Sec-
tion 776.013 of the Florida statute, which many states have followed,"4
provides in part:
(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great
bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or
likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if:
(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully
and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or oc-
cupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against
that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and
(b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and
forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred."s
The statute further provides:
(4) A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person's dwelling,
residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an un-
lawful act involving force or violence."'
113 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-704 to -704.5 (2012); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 776.013, 776.032; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-21 to -24.2 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5224,
21-5231 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 503.055 to.085 (LexisNexis 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
05-07.1 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1289.25 (2011); S.C. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-11-410 to -450 (2012). For similar statutes, see, e.g., LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(A)(4)(a), (B) (2007); Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2(2), (3) (2013); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (West Supp. 2013); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32 (West 2011); Wis. STAT.
§§ 895.62, 939.48 (2012). Some states have a common-law right to use deadly force to prevent a forci-
ble entry into a dwelling. See, e.g., State v. McCuiston, 514 N.W.2d 802, 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
114 See supra note 113 and accompanying text; see also Lydia Zbrzeznj, Comment, Florida's
Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting Citizens to Arm Themselves and Broadly Recognizing
the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 231, 266-73 (2012) (describing Florida as a
"trendsetter in national gun policy"). For background on some of these statutes, see generally Jason W.
Bobo, Comment, Following the Trend: Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat and Encourages Citizens
to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 339-40 (2008); Denise M. Drake, Comment, The Castle
Doctrine: An Expanding Right to Stand Your Ground, 39 ST. MARY'S L.J. 573 (2008) (discussing Texas
statute); Wyatt Holliday, Comment, "The Answer to Criminal Aggression Is Retaliation ": Stand- Your-
Ground Laws and the Liberalization of Self- Defense, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 407 (2012) (discussing Flori-
da, Ohio, and Wisconsin statutes); Joshua G. Light, Comment, The Castle Doctrine - The Lobby Is My
Dwelling, 22 WIDENER L.J. 219 (2012) (discussing Pennsylvania statute); Daniel J. Merrett, Comment,
Crimes and Offenses, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 27 (2006) (discussing Georgia statute); J.P. Neyland,
Comment, A Man 's Car Is His Castle: The Expansion of Texas' "Castle Doctrine" Eliminating the
Duty to Retreat in Areas Outside the Home, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 719 (2008) (discussing Texas statute);
Sarah A. Pohlman, Comment, Shooting from the Hip: Missouri's New Approach to Defense of Habita-
tion, 56 ST. Louis U. L.J. 857 (2012) (discussing Missouri statute); Annie Wells, Note, Home on the
Gun Range: Discussing Whether Kansas 's New Stand Your Ground Statute Will Protect Gun Owners
Who Use Disproportionate Force in Self-Defense, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 983 (2008) (discussing Kansas
statute).
115 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(1).
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Section 776.032 of the statute provides the following immunity:
(1) A person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified
in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of
such force, unless the person against whom force was used is a law enforcement officer, as
defined in s. 943.10(14), who was acting in the performance of his or her official duties and
the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person
using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement
officer. As used in this subsection, the term "criminal prosecution" includes arresting, detain-
ing in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant." 7
Determining the meaning of the term "presumption" is the first step in
interpreting and applying statutes like Florida's. The presumption could be
treated as a rebuttable presumption (i.e., a burden-shifting device that re-
quires the state to show that the immunity does not apply by presenting
evidence that will rebut the presumption)."' Such a burden-shifting pre-
sumption does not raise constitutional problems. The victim's fundamental
right to life is not violated if the traditional rules governing self-defense are
used,"' including "imperfect" self-defense, which some jurisdictions use to
lessen the punishment where, for example, the defendant had an honest but
unreasonable belief in the necessity of resorting to deadly force to defend
against death or serious harm.'20 Moreover, it is virtually certain that a pre-
sumption in favor of the defense would not violate the defendant's rights
because the states possess wide latitude in defining the elements of crimes
and apportioning the burden of proof. 2'
However, some jurisdictions, including Florida, have interpreted the
term to mean a conclusive presumption in the sense that if, for example, the
116 Id § 776.013(4).
117 Id. § 776.032(1). Section 776.012 addresses defense of persons, and Section 776.031 addresses
protection of real property. Section 776.012 authorizes the use of deadly force in situations involving
imminent death or serious bodily harm where permitted in Section 776.013. Section 776.031 authorizes
such force where "necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony."
Section 776.032 also provides:
(2) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of force
as described in subsection (1), but the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless
it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was used was unlawful.
(3) The court shall award reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, compensation for loss of in-
come, and all expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of any civil action brought by a
plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant is immune from prosecution as provided in sub-
section (1).
Id. § 776.032(2)-(3).
118 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07.1 (2012) (stating that the presumption "may be rebut-
ted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(B)(3) (LexisNexis Supp.
2013) (stating that the presumption "may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence").
119 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional rules of self-
defense.
120 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 5.7(i), at 500-01.
121 See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 232-33 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
201-02 (1977).
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person using the deadly force demonstrates by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of Section 776.013 were applica-
ble, the state may not try to rebut the presumption.122 In such a case, Section
776.032's immunity automatically applies. As a result, the presumption is,
in effect, a "rule" providing immunity from prosecution or civil liability
where the person who used deadly force proves that the statutory presump-
tion applicable to "forcible" intrusions applies.123
This "rule" effectively eliminates the traditional requirement that the
use of force in self-defense be proportional to the threat (i.e., that deadly
force only be used to resist an imminent threat of death or serious harm).124
The impact of this rejection of proportionality is illustrated by State v. Dun-
can,125 which held: (1) that, in enacting South Carolina's version of the
Florida statute,126 the legislature meant to provide a pretrial forum to ad-
dress the immunity; (2) that an order granting the immunity is immediately
appealable; and (3) that Duncan was entitled to the immunity.'27 More gen-
erally, Duncan held that if, at the pretrial hearing, the defendant shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that forcible entry was involved, the immun-
ity applies.128 The court viewed the presumptive immunity as conclusive
and held that the immunity applied, and thus barred prosecution, in Dun-
can's case because the facts "showed by a preponderance of the evidence
that the victim [Spicer] was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully en-
tering ... [the] home in accordance with" the requirements of the statute.129
However, the evidence also indicated that the presumption of "reason-
able fear of imminent death or great bodily harm" could have been easily
122 See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text for further discussion of this conclusive pre-
sumption.
123 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-20 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that
a conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule and that some conclusive presumptions have
been stricken down on substantive due process grounds).
124 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
125 709 S.E.2d 662 (S.C. 2011). The Supreme Court of South Carolina subsequently held that a
denial of a request for immunity is not immediately appealable. State v. Isaac, 747 S.E.2d 677, 681 (S.C.
2013). For a critique of this holding, see F. Patrick Hubbard, A Messy Menace: Immunity Under the
South Carolina "Protection of Persons and Property Act," SCLAWBLOG (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://www.sclawreview.org/blog/2013/09/17/messy-menace-immunity-south-carolina-protection-
persons-property-act/.
126 The South Carolina statute is virtually identical to the Florida statute. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-11-410 to -450 (2012).
127 Duncan, 709 S.E.2d at 663.
128 Id. at 665.
129 Id. See infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text for further discussion of reasons for this
interpretation. The standard of review on appeal is not clear. At one point, the court states that "there is
evidence to support the circuit court's finding that respondent was entitled to immunity." Duncan, 709
S.E.2d at 665. This language suggests a limited form of appellate review. However, the court also states:
"We find respondent showed by a preponderance of the evidence that [he was entitled to the immun i-
ty]." Id For further discussion of the procedural problems with the Act, see Hubbard, supra note 125.
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rebutted. Prior to the killing, Duncan and Spicer, along with their girl-
friends, were in Duncan's home. 3 ' At one point, Duncan became angry
with Spicer for making inappropriate comments concerning a photograph of
Duncan's daughter in a cheerleading outfit and asked Spicer to leave.' 3'
According to the trial testimony of Duncan's girlfriend (Templeton):
[Spicer] left but returned a few minutes later. [He] was opening the screened porch door
when [Duncan] exited the front door of the house onto the porch with the gun. At one
point, [Spicer] began advancing across the porch and Templeton was "between [them]" and
was "trying to get [Spicer] off the steps and leave." [Spicer] continued to force his way onto
the porch.132
At this point, Duncan shot and killed Spicer even though there was no evi-
dence that Templeton or Duncan was threatened by serious harm. Under the
statute, Duncan only had to show unlawful forcible entry in order to be im-
mune from prosecution.'
The Florida Court of Appeals reached a similar result under the Flori-
da statute in Hair v. State.134 In this case, the victim had forcefully entered
the defendant's car.' The court held that the conclusive presumption meant
that it was irrelevant that the victim may have been in the process of being
pulled from the car at the time of the fatal shooting.' According to the
conclusive presumption, the only important points were that the victim "had
unlawfully and forcefully entered" the vehicle and "was still inside the ve-
hicle when he was shot." 37
The net effect of conclusive presumption statutes like these is that citi-
zens are authorized to use deadly force in homes where, as in Duncan, a
guest has egregiously bad manners' and in vehicles, as in Hair, so long as




134 17 So. 3d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam). Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 463 (Fla.
2010), held that the approach in Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), "best effec-
tuates the intent of the Legislature" in adopting the immunity. Peterson held that the presumption was
intended to be applied in a pretrial proceeding. Peterson also noted that the legislature "intended to
establish a true immunity and not merely an affirmative defense." Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29. As evi-
dence of this intent, Peterson noted that the preamble to the legislation stated: "[T]he Legislature finds
that it is proper for law-abiding people to protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders
and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of themselves and others."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Protection of Persons/Justifiable Use of Force, ch. 2005-27, 2005
Fla. Laws 199, 200) (internal quotation marks omitted). See infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this interpretation.
135 Hair, 17 So. 3d at 805.
136 id
137 Id. at 805-06.
138 See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
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the victim has entered, or has attempted to enter, "forcefully." Regardless of
the factual details, the defendant is immune from prosecution simply be-
cause it is conclusively "presumed" that the defendant was threatened with
imminent death or serious harm.
B. Constitutionality
The effect of the use of a conclusive presumption in cases like Duncan
and Hair is that all "forcible" interferences (or attempted "forcible" inter-
ferences) with the right to exclude (or to require departure) from a dwelling,
residence, or occupied vehicle result in an authorization to use deadly force
so long as the person using the force knows or has reason to know of the
forcible interference. Given the fundamental right to life, the constitutional-
ity of this authorization of deadly force depends upon whether the govern-
ment can show both a compelling state interest and a narrow focus on pro-
tecting that interest.'" The weight of the interests protected by the authori-
zation of deadly force depends upon the weight given to the definition of
"home" and the weight given to the value of excluding persons from one's
"home," which clearly has a special character. As Heller and McDonald
indicate "'the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute'
in the home."I40 However, these Supreme Court cases do not elaborate on
the circumstances where deadly defense is appropriate. Nor do they define
"home" or elaborate on the values underlying the importance of a home.
In defining the terms for applying the statutory presumption, the Flori-
da and South Carolina schemes extend the concept of home to include
"dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle." 4 ' These terms are defined as
follows:
(a) "Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch,
whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which
has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein
at night.
(b) "Residence" means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanent-
ly or is visiting as an invited guest.
(c) "Vehicle" means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed
to transport people or property.1
42
Definitions (a) and (b) include things that are too broad to fit within the
traditional concept of home. As defined in (c), vehicles, particularly those
139 See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
140 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (quoting District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
141 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(1)(a) (West 2010); accord S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-430(1) (2006).
142 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(5); accord S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-430(l), (3)-(4).
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without motors, are an even broader view of home. Moreover, limiting the
presumption to "occupied" vehicles, while not limiting it to occupied dwell-
ings or residences, suggests that a person could use deadly force from out-
side the dwelling or residence if that person "knew or had reason to believe
that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occur-
ring or had occurred."l43
In order to address the breadth of these definitions, this Article focuses
initially on situations where a person is inside a traditional permanent
home. If the interest in the right to exclude from (or the right to remain in)
one's "sanctuary" within that home is not constitutionally sufficient to justi-
fy killing in all cases of forcible entry or ejection, then the interests that
broader definitions of home protect will also be insufficient.
The home as sanctuary protects a cluster of overlapping interests.'"
Privacy, both in terms of intrusion into the private sphere by the govern-
mentl45 and by private personsl4 and in terms of conduct within that
sphere,47 is the most obvious interest involved in the home. In addition, a
person usually has a property interest in the home, and this interest is
unique in many ways. First, it reinforces the privacy interest by providing a
right to exclude, which is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property." 48 Second, private
property, whether real or personal, is intimately connected with human per-
sonhood.149
143 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(l)(b); accord S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-440(A)(2).
144 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carijackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force
in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (identifying and critiquing interests
and analyzing the conflict of values involved in authorizations of deadly force to protect the home).
145 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. Ill (establishing limits on involuntary quartering of soldiers); Id
amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches). Justice Breyer, dissenting in Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U.S. 586 (2006), referred to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), as a "seminal Fourth Amend-
ment case, decided 120 years ago," and noted that the Boyd "Court wrote, in frequently quoted lan-
guage, that the Fourth Amendment's provisions apply 'to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employ[ee]s of the sanctity ofa man's home and the privacies of life."' 547 U.S. at 606 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630) (emphasis added).
146 See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1951) (upholding ordinance restricting
door-to-door solicitation at homes); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (up-
holding statute permitting addressee to stop delivery of sexually explicit materials to addressee's resi-
dence); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (imposing liability for intentional, highly
offensive intrusions "upon the solitude or seclusion of another, or his private affairs or concerns").
147 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (right to possess gun in
home for self-defense); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (right to engage in intimate sexual
relations within the home); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (right to read or watch items
within the home).
148 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
149 See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 18-21, 244-54 (2007) (noting the way inmates claim an exclusive
personal interest in things and space); 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 477
(1897) (noting the instinctual manner in which property "you have enjoyed and used as your own for a
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These interests are very important. However, they are already protect-
ed by a virtually universal right to "stand your ground" in the home in using
deadly force to prevent death or serious harm.'o5 Moreover, a state is per-
mitted to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
person did not have this right at the time of using deadly force.'"' This can
be an extremely difficult burden for the state to satisfy, particularly where
the defendant had to make sudden, immediate decisions about using force
under conditions of stress and uncertainty.'52 Such conditions exist, for ex-
ample, where one hears someone coming up the stairs to the landing outside
his bedroom at 3 a.m. and realizes it is not his wife or children, who are the
only other people who are supposed to be in the locked house.'
Statutes like those in Florida and South Carolina go beyond these pro-
cedural protections and substantively authorize deadly force in all cases of
"unlawful and forcible" acts. Such overbroad authorizations of the right to
use deadly force devalue the intruder's fundamental right to life by totally
abandoning the concern for proportionality between the threat and the re-
sponse to the threat.
Underlying this devaluation of the intruder's life is an extreme version
of two now-defunct views.'54 One is the view that deadly force is always
allowed to prevent a felony or burglary. The other is the view that, by
committing a "serious" crime, a criminal has forfeited his rights vis-a-vis
"law-abiding" people.
The Supreme Court in Garner clearly rejected the first view by deter-
mining that the categories of felony and burglary are too broad, by them-
selves, to justify the use of deadly force to prevent a crime.' The second
view assumes that all persons who have committed or may commit a "seri-
ous" crime are no longer entitled to the right to life. Such an expansive ap-
proach to loss of a fundamental right is simply a broader view of the first
and is therefore similarly inadequate under Garner and under the Eighth
Amendment death penalty cases.
long time ... takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying
to defend yourself"); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 957
(1982); supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (referring to Locke's concern for property rights in
"estates" and "possessions").
150 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(c)(I)-(2) (West 2005) (defining the right to use deadly force
by reference to whether such force is "immediately necessary" and the encounter with the intruder was
"sudden and unexpected").
153 The Author had this experience. Luckily, the intruder left quickly when he heard the Author
indicate to his wife that he was going (even though unarmed) to see what was going on outside their
bedroom door.
154 See, e.g., Green, supra note 144, at 28-30, 36-39; Kadish, supra note 8, at 883-85.
155 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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The forfeiture theory underlies the choice of the Florida and South
Carolina legislatures to authorize "law-abiding people to protect them-
selves, their families, and others from intruders and attackers without fear
of prosecution."' In effect, the legislature has divided the world into two
categories: (1) "law-abiding people" and (2) "intruders and attackers." As a
result of this division, "intruders and attackers" forfeit their right to life, and
therefore "law-abiding people" may kill them. Thus, Duncan was free to
shoot Spicer because Duncan was "law-abiding" and Spicer, as a forcible
intruder, had forfeited his fundamental right to life.
Such a forfeiture scheme is flawed in many ways.' First, the attackers
have certainly not agreed to the forfeiture. Second, if the forfeiture occurs
during the attack, why does the attacker regain his right to life if the attack-
er stops and withdraws?' Third, the forfeiture scheme relies on a simplistic
division of people into two categories, law abiding and law breaking, even
though all of us are in both categories. None of us abides by all the laws all
the time. Who has not done at least one of the following: speeding, not re-
porting taxable income, illegal copying of music or video, or jaywalking?
Similarly, no one disobeys all the laws all the time.
Fourth, forfeiture diverts attention from the central focus of Heller and
McDonald: "the inherent right of self-defense."" Analysis of this right
requires recognition that both the defender and the attacker have a funda-
mental right to life. Therefore, the defender has a right to defend his life
against a person threatening death or serious harm but does not have a right
to use deadly force against a "law breaker" who threatens less serious
harm.'60 More specifically, the right of self-defense does not empower a
defendant to use force that is so out of proportion to the threat that the at-
tacker's fundamental right to life becomes so devalued that it is worth vir-
tually nothing.
In terms of the specifics of the statutes involved, however, it is not
necessary to balance the fundamental right to life against the sanctuary of
the home because these statutory extensions were not adopted in order to
protect the sanctuary of the home. Instead, the purpose of conclusively im-
munizing deadly force in all cases of "forcible" intrusion is to protect de-
fendants from the cost, unpleasantness, and inconvenience of criminal or
civil proceedings.
156 See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
157 See Kadish, supra note 8, at 883-85.
158 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.041(2)(b) (West 2010) (providing that an initial aggressor's
right to use deadly force revives where the initial aggressor withdraws); State v. Bryant, 520 S.E.2d 319,
322 (S.C. 1999) (same); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Ferdinand
S. Tinio, Annotation, Comment Note: Withdrawal, After Provocation of Conflict, as Reviving Right of
Self-Defense, 55 A.L.R. 3d 1000, 1003-04 (1974).
159 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
160 See Kadish, supra note 8, at 886-87.
646 [VOL. 21:3
2014] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CITIZENS' USE OF DEADLY FORCE
The focus on this concern is clear from the legislative statements of
purpose: "[T]he Legislature finds that it is proper for law-abiding people to
protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders and attackers
without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of them-
selves and others."' 6 ' Both the Florida and South Carolina courts relied on
this language in finding that the immunity was a "true immunity, and not
simply an affirmative defense" and that therefore the presumption was con-
clusive. 6 1
These statutes grant "law-abiding" citizens the discretionary power to
choose, with no due process, whether to respond to a nonserious threat in-
volving a "forcible" intrusion either by killing or by using non-deadly
measures. The justification for the authorization of this discretionary power
to kill is a concern that "law-abiding people" not have a "fear of prosecu-
tion" for killing.' 6 1 Such prosecution, however, will be subject to the re-
quirements of due process, including a right to an attorney and burdens
phrased in terms of "innocent until proven guilty" and "proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt," on the issue of whether the killing was necessary
to prevent death or serious harm. This interest in protecting persons who
use deadly force from fear of prosecution is not sufficiently compelling or
essential to justify abandoning the concern for proportionality recognized in
Garner and authorizing deadly force in all cases of unlawful forcible entry.
The constitutional flaws in authorizing deadly force in all cases of for-
cible intrusion into a traditional home are even more obvious in the use of
broader definitions of "residence" in the statutes. Because the interests pro-
tected by the right to exclude from a "vehicle," particularly a vehicle as
defined in the statutes, are no greater than those involved in exclusion from
the home,' the conclusive presumption approach of these statutes in the
context of vehicles and "carjackings" is also unconstitutional.' 6 1
161 Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
Protection of Persons/Justifiable Use of Force, ch. 2005-27, 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 200) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); accord S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-420(B) (2006) (containing language virtually
identical to the preamble to the Florida legislation).
162 State v. Duncan, 709 S.E.2d 662, 665 (S.C. 2011); see id. at 663-65 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-420(B), which is virtually identical to the Florida preamble quoted supra at text accompanying
note 161, and emphasizing "without fear ofprosecution"); see also Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462
(Fla. 2010) (adopting the reasoning of Peterson, discussed supra at notes 134 and 161, and noting that
the immunity provision "establishes entitlement . .. not [to] be subjected to trial").
163 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
164 Cf, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985) (granting less protection to a vehicle,
because of its mobility, than to a house).
165 The same analysis would apply to statutes that only address carjacking. For an example of such
statutes, see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.350(e) (West Supp. 2013).
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C. Other Schemes
Many states authorize the use of deadly force against an intruder who
is committing a burglary, felony, or unlawful trespass.166 However, as Gar-
ner noted, both felony and burglary have such broad definitions that nei-
ther, by itself, can justify the use of deadly force.'16  Consequently, schemes
authorizing deadly force in all cases of invasion involving a felony or bur-
glary are, like the overbroad "forcible entry" approach of the Florida and
South Carolina statutory schemes, unconstitutional. Statutes authorizing
deadly force for the protection of property are similarly overbroad.'6 1
IV. SELF DEFENSE: RETREAT VERSUS "STAND YOUR GROUND"
As indicated above, traditional approaches to self-defense have dif-
fered over whether a person faced with a threat of death or serious bodily
harm has a duty to retreat if such retreat can be done safely.'" Some states
have not required retreat; other states, on the theory that deadly force in
166 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2006) (use of physical force against occupant of dwelling in
connection with burglary); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-407 (2012) (criminal trespass of dwelling,
whether occupied or not); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-20 (1989) (unlawful forcible entry of dwelling,
whether occupied or not); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 469 (2007) (possible infliction of personal injury;
refusal to surrender); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.031 (West 2010) ("forcible felony"); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-23 (2011) ("habitation" where assault or "offer of personal violence," "unlawful and forcible
entry," or felony); id. § 16-3-24 (property where "the person using such force reasonably believes that it
is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony"); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1(a)
(2002) ("forcible felony"); id. at 5/7-2 ("assault," "offer of personal violence," or "felony"); IND. CODE
§ 35-41-3-2 (2004) ("forcible felony" or "unlawful entry .. . or attack"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5223(a)
(West 2012) ("unlawful entry into or attack upon [the] person's dwelling, place of work or occupied
vehicle"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(3) (2006) (burglary); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.065 (West
2009) (felony); Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (Westlaw through 2010) (forcible felony, unlawful entry);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-103 (West 2009) (forcible felony, assault); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 627:4.11(d) (LexisNexis 2007) (any unlawful force or felony in dwelling or curtilage). Many of these
statutes use the term "forcible felony." However, the definitions of forcible felony are often overbroad.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.08 (including burglary and "any other felony which involves the use or
threat of physical force or violence against any individual"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.011(3) (including
burglary); N.Y PENAL LAW § 35.20(3) (McKinney 2009) (including burglary); id § 140.20 (defining
burglary in the third degree).
167 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1985). For further discussions of such overbreadth,
see, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, From the Thief in the Night to the Guest Who Stayed Too Long: The
Evolution of Burglary in the Shadow of the Common Law, 45 IND. L. REV. 629, 629 (2012); Elaine M.
Chiu, Culture in Our Midst, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231, 248-50 (2006); Green, supra note 144,
at 25-30; Sarah A. Pohlman, supra note 114, at 859-60.
168 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-7 (West 2003) ("Homicide is justifiable when ... committed
in the necessary defense of... property ... ").
169 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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self-defense is not necessary in such a situation, have required it.' In a
state requiring retreat, a person does not have a duty to retreat in his home
or, in most states, his office."' In addition, some states explicitly require
that the defendant know that retreat with complete personal safety is possi-
ble.172
Recently, state legislatures in states with a duty to retreat have adopted
statutes eliminating any duty to retreat.'73 For example, Section 776.012 of
the Florida scheme discussed in Part III above provides:
A person is justified in using force, except deadly force, against another when and to the ex-
tent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or
herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person is
justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if:
(1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or
great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of
a forcible felony; or
(2) Under those circumstances permitted pursuant to s. 776.013.174
As indicated above, because Section 776.013 (the second subsection's
set of situations where there is no duty to retreat) authorizes the use of
deadly force in all forcible intrusions, the section is an unconstitutionally
overbroad denial of the fundamental right to life."' The authorization in
Subsection 776.012(1) of deadly force to prevent the commission of a "for-
cible felony" has the same flaw because the category of forcible felony is
too broad.'76
The authorization in the first part of Subsection 776.012(1) of deadly
force to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm is not subject to the
same overbreadth shortcomings that characterize Section 776.013 or the
authorization in the second part of Subsection 776.012(1) to use deadly
force to prevent a forcible felony. Garner indicates that tailored authoriza-
tions of deadly force like that in the first part of Subsection 776.012(1) are
constitutional. 177
170 See supra notes 43, 46 and accompanying text.
171 See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text.
172 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.335(b) (West Supp. 2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
607(b) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b) (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(e)(2) (2007);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1409(4) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b) (West 2005);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
173 See, e.g., supra note 113 and accompanying text.
174 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2010).
175 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 57, 155, 166 and accompanying text. As indicated supra in note 166, "forcible
felony" includes burglary and any felony involving the threat or use of force or violence.
177 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, I1-12 (1985) (holding that deadly force may be used
where the "suspect threatens the officer with a weapon" or "committed a crime involving ... serious
physical harm").
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Subsection 776.012 also authorizes a person to "stand his ground" ra-
ther than retreat even where the person is outside his sanctuary and it is not
necessary to prevent death or serious harm. Does Garner's concern for pro-
portionality apply by analogy to the necessity requirement? If so, is this
approach narrowly tailored to protect a compelling state interest?
Answering these questions requires recognition of the no-duty-to-
retreat approach's long history in the United States. As a part of this histo-
ry, it appears that the U.S. Supreme Court has sided with those states that
have traditionally used the no-duty-to-retreat approach. More specifically,
in exercising its common law powers, the Court recognized a right to use
deadly force without retreating when a person was on his own land in
Beard v. United States"' and his place of business in Brown v. United
States."' Beard went further and noted in dicta:
[A] true man who is without fault is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who by violence or
surprise maliciously seeks to take his life or to do him enormous bodily harm.'"
... Indeed, the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against the
enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when assailed, to avoid chastisement
or even to save human life . ... The weight of modem authority, in ourjudgment, establishes
the doctrine that, when a person, being without fault and in a place where he has a right to be,
is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force by force, and if, in the reasona-
ble exercise of his right of self-defence, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable.""
Here, the Court said,
[t]he defendant was where he had the right to be, when the deceased advanced upon him in a
threatening manner, and with a deadly weapon; and if the accused did not provoke the assault
and had at the time reasonable grounds to believe and in good faith believed, that the de-
ceased intended to take his life or do him great bodily harm, he was not obliged to retreat,
nor to consider whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground .... 182
The language in the last quotation from Beard was quoted and relied upon
in Rowe v. United States,'3 which held that there was no duty to retreat
where the killing occurred in a hotel office area open to the public.'"
Today, references to obligations in terms of a "true man" connote neg-
ative stereotypes, like sexist and macho, which arguably suggest excessive
testosterone rather than reasoned values. Though the "true man" perspective
178 158 U.S. 550, 564 (1895) (finding no duty to retreat where the defendant was "on his premises,
outside of his dwelling-house").
179 256 U.S. 335, 344 (1921) (discussing jury instructions in a case where the defendant's use of
force occurred in "a place where he was called to be, in the discharge of his duty").
180 Beard, 158 U.S. at 561 (quoting Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199-200 (1876)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
181 Id. at 561-62 (quoting Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877)).
182 Id at 564 (emphasis added).
183 164 U.S. 546 (1896).
184 Id. at 557.
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might, therefore, appear to be a relic of an outmoded frontier, the values
involved in "the tendency of the American mind" can easily be rephrased in
more familiar terms like personhood, autonomy, and liberty. These con-
cepts fit well with the concept of home as a sanctuary central to privacy and
personhood.'" People retreat from the problems of life by going home, not
leaving it. Similarly, one's job enables her to pay for her home and other
necessities of life. For many people, the job also helps define one's person-
hood. Thus, the Supreme Court's recognition of a right to stand your
ground at one's home or place of work is grounded in values of liberty and
autonomy. If deadly force is used to resist an unprovoked threat of death or
serious harm, the proportionality concerns of Garner are addressed. In addi-
tion, the importance of the home or office as a sanctuary provides a compel-
ling, narrowly focused reason for allowing a defender to use deadly force
even though a safe retreat from the sanctuary would have been feasible.
The right to stand your ground in a public area, with no duty to retreat,
cannot rely on the interest in sanctuary. Is the interest in freedom to move
about freely without yielding to an unprovoked, unlawful threat of deadly
force sufficiently compelling to justify taking an attacker's life, rather than
retreating where it is clearly safe to do so?' The long history of the use of
the no-retreat approach in the United States is relevant to the answer to this
question in two ways.
First, the history shows an ongoing commitment by some states to the
right to stand one's ground. Arguably, such a history should not matter be-
cause Garner held that, even though the authority to shoot all fleeing felons
had a long history, deadly force had to be limited to fleeing suspects who
posed serious danger if not apprehended. However, Garner stressed that the
definitions of felony and burglary had changed and that felons are not au-
tomatically subject to the death penalty anymore.' No such changes apply
in terms of the issue of retreat.
Second, the history indicates that stand your ground may not lead to a
substantial increase in successful claims of self-defense. In all the debate on
the issue, there do not seem to be any studies showing a significant differ-
ence between retreat jurisdictions and no-retreat jurisdictions in the occur-
rence of homicides justified by self-defense.
Given these two points concerning the no-duty-to-retreat approach, it
may be that the issue of retreat in a public place is a matter for which the
185 See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
186 This interest could be particularly important if one repeatedly had to give up freedom of move-
ment by retreating frequently in the face of repeated deadly threats by the same person. On the one hand,
such an extreme situation would itself constitute a crime, see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-700 (Supp.
2013), and should arguably be addressed by requesting police assistance rather than using deadly force.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.04 (1985). On the other hand, a continuing
pattern would arguably indicate a failure on the part of the government to provide sufficient protection
to uphold its part of the social contract. Such a failure arguably supports the right to stand your ground.
187 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985).
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balancing of values should legitimately be left to legislative discretion.
Such deference to the legislature is bolstered by the requirement that a per-
son claiming self-defense be without fault in provoking the confrontation."
For example, even though Florida is a no-duty-to-retreat jurisdiction,' 9
Section 776.041(2)(a) of the Florida Code provides:
The justification described in the preceding sections of this chapter is not available to a per-
son who . .. [i]nitially provokes the use of force against himself or herself, unless . . . [s]uch
force is so great that the person reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm and that he or she has exhausted every reasonable means to es-
cape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily
harm to the assailant .... .9
The application of this provision, as well as the other requirements of
self-defense, could be complicated by Florida's right to a pretrial hearing on
whether there is immunity from prosecution.'9' In August 2012, George
Zimmerman's attorney indicated a desire to have such a pretrial hearing.' 92
The judge appeared to press for conducting the hearing in April 2013.'" At
this point, Zimmerman's attorney indicated an interest in combining the
hearing and the trial.194 However, Zimmerman eventually waived his right
to a pretrial hearing.'
It is understandable why any defendant, not just Zimmerman, might be
hesitant to assert the right to a separate pretrial hearing on immunity. If the
defendant loses the motion, the purpose of such a hearing-eliminating
188 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
189 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3) (West 2010) ("right to stand his or her ground").
190 Id. § 776.041(2)(a) (emphasis added).
191 See supra notes 122-123, 126-129, 130, 161-162 and accompanying text.
192 See Rene Stutzman, Can Zimmerman Win 'Stand Your Ground' Hearing?, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Aug. 9, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-08-09/news/os-george-zimmerman-stand-your-
ground-20120809 I_george-zimmerman-trayvon-martin-mark-o-mara.
193 Rene Stutzman, Judge Denies George Zimmerman's Request to Delay 'Stand Your Ground'
Hearing, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 14, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-02-14/news/
os-george-zimmerman-scheduling-conference-20130214 1 george-zimmerman-trayvon-martin-judge-
rules.
194 Jeff Weiner, George Zimmerman Defense Ponders Request to Combine 'Stand Your Ground'
Hearing with Trial, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 17, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-
02-17/news/os-george-zimmerman-stand-your-ground-trial-20130217_lgeorge-zimmerman-trayvon-
martin-mark-o-mara. A combined hearing would make no sense for two reasons. First, the purpose of
the immunity is to enable the potential defendant to avoid the costs of a criminal trial. Second, a defend-
ant is entitled to move for a directed verdict of acquittal. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.380(a). Zimmerman may
have been more likely to prevail on this motion, based on a burden on the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, than on his motion, based on his burden to show a right to the immunity
based on the preponderance of the evidence.
195 Rene Stutzman & Jeff Weiner, George Zimmerman Won't Have Pretrial 'Stand Your Ground'
Hearing, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/george-
zimmerman-trial/os-george-zimmerman-stand-your-ground-right-20130430,0,340410. story.
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expense and fear of prosecution '--would be largely defeated, particularly
if a judge's decision to deny the immunity for failure to satisfy the prepon-
derance-of-the-evidence standard is not appealable.' Moreover, a hearing
before trial could provide the prosecution with an opportunity to learn de-
tails about the defense. If the defendant testifies, the prosecution will get a
chance to cross-examine in detail under oath. In addition, the defendant
might also have to consider whether to strengthen his immunity case by
waiving any possible claims of the Fifth Amendment right to refuse to an-
swer questions that could incriminate him. Given these possibilities, if a
defendant does not succeed at the pretrial hearing in achieving the immuni-
ty from prosecution, the hearing could conceivably provide considerable
advantages to the prosecution.
V. APPLICATION ISSUES
The argument herein is that some legal authorizations of deadly force
fail to satisfy the constitutional requirement of proportionality between the
level of the threat and the amount of force used. Obviously, despite broad
statutory language that does not satisfy the standard of proportionality,
many instances of defensive deadly force will be proportional to the threat.
In other words, the schemes may not be facially unconstitutional, and as-
applied constitutional challenges may be required.
However, a declaration of constitutionality on an as-applied basis
could involve the unfairness of punishing a person for acting "lawfully"
pursuant to an unconstitutional authorization of deadly force. Perhaps the
best approach in this situation is to allow the defense and make the ruling of
unconstitutionality prospective only.' Prospective application in the crimi-
nal context would not necessarily remove incentives for prosecutors to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the authorization. As repeat players in the
criminal justice system, prosecutors have a stake in future cases, as well as
the one involved in the challenge.
A prospective ruling might also be appropriate in a civil case because
it is arguably unfair to impose civil liability retrospectively. Garner, in ef-
fect, followed this approach because the police officer involved had acted in
good faith reliance on the statutes and thus had qualified immunity.' How-
ever, a weakness of this approach is that plaintiffs (and their contingency-
fee paid attorneys) may have less incentive to bring the case. Garner was
able to satisfy this concern for incentivizing plaintiffs' attorneys by a Court
196 See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
197 See, e.g., State v. Isaac, 747 S.E.2d 677, 679 (S.C. 2013) (holding denial of request for immuni-
ty not immediately appealable). For a critique of Isaac, see supra note 125.
198 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 2.4.
199 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5, 22 (1985).
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of Appeals determination that the police department could be held liable for
damages.2" State courts have reached a similar result by allowing the plain-
tiff in a rule-changing case to recover under the new rule while treating all
other claims on the basis of a prospective overruling.20 1
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that most states have authorizations of citi-
zen's use of deadly force which are unconstitutionally overbroad insofar as
they include situations where the state interest involved is not sufficiently
compelling to justify a denial of the fundamental right to life. This argu-
ment can be summarized in terms of eight assertions.
First, life is so fundamentally important that all successful nation states
claim and exercise a meaningful monopoly of the legitimate use of deadly
force.
Second, because of this monopoly, the only categories of deadly force
are: (1) authorized, and (2) prohibited.
Third, the Constitution places limits on the government's exercise of
the monopoly on deadly force.
Fourth, authorizations of deadly force in the context of a citizen's ar-
rest are unconstitutionally overbroad if they authorize the use of deadly
force to implement the arrest where such force is not necessary to prevent
death or serious harm.
Fifth, authorizations of deadly force in the context of a forcible intru-
sion into one's home are unconstitutionally overbroad if they authorize the
use of deadly force where such force is not necessary to prevent death or
serious harm.
Sixth, authorizations of deadly force in the context of preventing any
burglary, any felony, or a threat to property are unconstitutionally over-
broad if they authorize the use of deadly force where such force is not nec-
essary to prevent death or serious harm.
Seventh, authorizations of deadly force in the context of confronting
an unprovoked deadly threat in a public place may be unconstitutionally
overbroad if they authorize the use of deadly force where such force is not
necessary because retreat is a clearly safe option.
Eighth, because of the unfairness of applying a constitutional limit in
the context where a citizen has acted in accordance with an overbroad au-
200 See Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 1993).
201 See, e.g., Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 520 S.E.2d 142, 156 (S.C.
1999); Marcum v. Bowden, 643 S.E.2d 85, 90-91 (S.C. 2007) (Toal, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (arguing that change in rule concerning tort liability should not be prospective for claimant
bringing successful challenge); ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE
LAW 39-53 (1969).
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thorization of deadly force, a prospective declaration of unconstitutionality
may be appropriate.
Though much has been written about the widespread ownership and
violent use of guns in the United States, no one has made the arguments
contained in this Article. Accepting these arguments and limiting overbroad
authorizations may not have a major impact on gun violence. However, it
will be an important step in protecting our fundamental right to life and will
also, hopefully, save some lives that might otherwise be taken by "lawful"
violence.

